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NORTH DAKOTA BAR BRIEFS
CONTEMPT - MISCONDUCT IN PRESENCE OF COURT - LIMITS ON THE
PowEn TO PUNISH SUMMARILY FOR CONTEMPT
T HE RECENT case of Fisher v. Pace I has again raised the questionof the proper exercise by the courts of power to punish sum-
marily for contempt in the light of both constitutionality and jus-
tice. In that case an attorney was punished for contempt when he
repeated in a different form an argument to the jury to which an
objection had been sustained.2 Previously in Caldwell v. United
States,s a case with facts analagous to Fisher v. Pace, the exercise
of such power was held unwarranted, since a willful attempt to
evade the court's ruling was insufficiently shown.4 In that case the
the court said: "Thus suddenly to punish for conduct of doubtful
propriety only, where the intent to be insubordinate is not clear,
might very well have the result of deterring an atttorney -of less
courage and experinence from doing his full duty to his client.
" 5
Between the two points of view an inconsistency obviously exists,
and thus the question arises as to which case reaches the better
result.
FUNDAMENTALS .OF CONTEMPT
In considering the power of a court to punish for contempt, it
first becomes necessary to determine what class of contempt is in-
volved. Generally, contempts may be divided into two classes,
direct and constructive, the test being whether the misbehavior
constituting the contempt is committed within or outside the pres-
ence of the court.6 If the contempt is committed within the pres-
ence of the court it is a direct contempt. Contempts, however are
also classed as civil or criminal. Whether a contempt action is civil
1336 U.S. 155 (1949); See also 34 Iowa L. Rev. 673 (1949).
2 Attorney Fisher was attempting to explain the difference between specific injury and
general injury in an action under state workmen's compensation law and in so doing
mentioned that for a specific injury the most compensation he could receive would be
for 125 weeks, and this times the average weekly compensation rate. This was objected
to and the objection sustained. He then stated that his client could only recover 125
weeks compensation at whatever compensation the rate will figure under the law. Objection
was again sustained, and Fisher attempted to explain his position. The court said, "Don't
argue with me." The court also threatened to declare a mistrial if he "messed" with him.
Fisher took exception to the conduct of the court and then the court fined him. Eventually
the fine was up to $100.00 and three days in jail, after Fisher had remarked that he
shouldn't be fined for trying to represent his client. O1 certiorari it was held that he
was not denied due process; Fisher contended unsuccessfully that no facts constituting
contempt appeared.
'28 F.2d 684 (9th Cir. 1928).
'Punishment of attorney as for contempt by imposing $50.00 fine on attorney's question
on cross examination, "Isn't it a fact you registered under the name of Kennard?" after
the court .had sustained objection to the previous question, "You registered under what
name?"
'28 F.2d 684 (9th Cir. 1928).
aThis is not an easy test to apply. O'Mally v. United States, 128 F.2d 676 (8th Cir.
1942), Rev'd sub nora. 317 U.S. 412 (1943), on other grounds.
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or criminal is, oddly enough, a problem often turning on fine dis-
tinctions. The rule most often laid down as the test is that criminal
contempt proceedings are brought to preserve the power and vin-
dicate the dignity and integrity of the court and to punish for dis-
obedience of its orders, whereas civil contempt proceedings are
brought to preserve and enforce the rights of private litigants and
to compel obedience to orders and decrees made for the benefit of
such litigants.7 A further distinction may be drawn between civil
and criminal contempt cases in that the judgment in a civil con-
tempt case is remedial, coercive, and looks to the future, while the
judgment in the latter class is punitive and punishes a past act.8
The nature of the relief sought determines whether the contempt
proceedings is civil or criminal. 9
As the two cases previously mentioned, Fisher v.-Pace and Cald-
well v. United States, involve direct, criminal contempt, this com-
ment is limited to the power to punish summarily for direct, crim-
inal contempt. Historically the inherent power of courts to punish
contempts in the face of the court without further proof of facts
and without aid of a jury is not open to question.'0 Direct contempts
are punishable without granting the contemnor a hearing or chance
to present defense." Such summary conviction and punishment
has been held duo process of law, the reasoning being that it is
essential to the protection of the courts in the discharge of their
functions."
Guiding Principles in the Application of such summary Power
In the application of the foregoing general principles, we should
not attempt to apply the generalizations to every case. They should
not be applied indiscriminately and in a haphazard manner. Thus,
the courts should bear in mind a few guiding principles. There
are many, but some of the relevant ones are discussed hereafter and
should be applied so as not to deprive one of due process of law.
Liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment are too highly prized
to be subjpcted to the hazards of summary contempt procedure.1s
See O'Mally v. United States, 128 F.2d 676, 683 (8th Cir. 1942).
Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33 (1941); Walling v. Crane, 158 F.2d 80 (5th Cir.
1946).
9 Penfield Co. v. Sec. 330 U.S. 585 (1947).
104 B1. Comm. 284 et seq. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948); Eilenbecker v. District
Court, 134 U.S. 31 (1890); Ex parte Savin, 131 U.S. 267 (1889); Ex parte Terry,
128 U.S. 289 (1888); O'Mally v. United States, 128 F.2d 676 (8th Cir. 1942).
1
1
Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289 (1888).
1 Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289 (1888). But ct. Ex parte Hudgings, 249 U.S. 378 (1919)
(Perjury alone not punishable by contempt proceedings unless an actual obstruction to the
court in the discharge of its duty appears.)13
See Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1946); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331
(1946); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
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The Constitution forbids a judge from summarily punishing for
contempt except in rare instances where the attack might reason-
ably cause a real impediment to the administration of justice.' 4
The inherent power to punish for contempt does not mean that such
power is unlimited. The power to punish for contempt should be
exercised with great caution, and only as a preservative and not as
a vindicative measure. 5 Summary punishment for contempt is per-
missible only when it is essential to prevent demoralization of the
court's authority before the public. 16 In Toledo Newspaper Co. v.
United States,1 7 a case of contempt by publication, it was held that
so long as the misbehavior has a reasonable tendency to obstruct
the administration of justice, it is punishable.18 However, this was
completely overruled in later decisions where it was held that the
misbehavior must present a "clear and present danger" to the ad-
ministration of justice.19 In Bridges v. California 20 the clear and
present danger rule was applied to form the working principle
that the substantive evil must be extremely serious and the degree
of imminence extremely high before utterances can be punished.
The test to be applied is not the remote or possible effect, but the
danger must immediately impend.2 ' The exercise of the power to
punish summarily for contempt ". . . is a delicate one and care is
needed to avoid arbitrary or oppressive conclusions," said Mr. Jus-
tice Taft in Cooke v. United States.22 In Clark v. United States'
-
it was said that the occurrence must be viewed as a unit in order
to appraise properly the misconduct, and the relationship of the
contemnor (in this case a juror) as an officer of the court must not
be lost sight of. In Ex parte Terry 24 the court gave no encourage-
ment to the expansion of the power to sentence for contempt, be-
14 Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1946).
2 Redman v. United States, 77 F.2d 126 (9th Cir. 1935); In re La Varre, 48 F.2d 216
(S.D. Ga. 1930). Cf. Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 529 (1925) (Where an
attorney remarked, "It is an unfortunate situation that a lawyer may, with flattery and
praise, seek to and actually influence judicial action, but he cannot speak the truth with
candor without being sent to jail. This is not as it should be.")
16In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 275 (1948). But compare the Oliver case with Craig v.
Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1946).
17 247 U.S. 402 (1918).
Is Mr. Chief Justice White, delivering the opinion of the court, said, "... not the
influence upon the mind of the particular judge is the criterion but the responsible tendency
of the acts done to influence or bring about the fateful rpsult is the test." 247 U.S. 402,
421 (1918).
19 Nye v. United States, 313 U. S. 33 (1941). Compare the dissenting opinion of Mr.
Justice Holmes in the Toledo Newspaper case with the opinion in Schenck v. United States,
249 U.S. 47 (1919), the case generally credited with establishing the "clear and present
danger" rule.
314 U.S. 252 (1941).
n Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1946). Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1945).
267 U.S. 517, 539 (1925).
= 289 U.S. 1 (1933) (juror held guilty of contempt for false statements made while
being examined as to qualifications).
-128 U.S. 289 (1888).
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yond the suppression and punishment of any court-disrupting mis-
conduct which alone justified its exercise. In the Terry case, Terry
committed an assault on the marshall who was at the moment remov-
ing a heckler from the courtroom. This occurred within personal
view of the judge. Under such circumstances a court has the
power to punish summarily for contempt. However, the court
cited Anderson v. Dunn,25 which had marked the limits of con-
tempt in general as being "the least possible power adequate to
the end proposed." 26 The Terry case was noted in Cooke v. United
Sates, supra, its language, however, not being interpreted as au-
thority to depart from basic due process procedural safeguards.
The distinction between the Terry case and the Cooke case is that
in the Cooke case the contempt was adjudged by reason of a con-
temptous letter, and thus the contempt was not in open court. Also
as distinguished from Ex Parte Terry, see In re Oliver,2 7 where a
witness was cited for contempt for giving false and evasive testi-
mony. He was not in court when other witnesses, upon whose
testimony the judge arrived at his decision that the testimony was
false, were testifying contrary to him. It was held that the circum-
stances of this case did not justify denial of due process, on the
ground that this was not a proper application of the summary
power for contempt committed in the court's actual presence.
2 8
In Pennsylvania and New York heated controversies arose over
alleged abuses in the exercise of the contempt power which in
both places culminated in legislation practically forbidding sum-
mary punishment for publications in newspapers.2 9 The summary
power of federal courts does not extend to any case except the
"misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto as to
obstruct the administration of justice." 30
It becomes necessary at this point to digress for a minute to
the subject of statutory construction. In Cooke v. United States,
06 Wheat. 204 (U.S. 1821).
" Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204, 231 (U.S. 1821). See also In re Michael, 326
U.S. 224 (1945).
2 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
2Cf. Ex parte Craig, 274 Fed. 177 (2d Cir. 1921).
2See Nelles & King, Contempt by Publication in the United States, 28 Col. L. Rev. 401,
409-422, 525 (1928). In North Dakota, the publication of a "false or grossly inaccurate
report" of the proceedings of a court is punishable as a contempt. N.D. Rev. Code
§12-1724(7) (1943). See State v. Nelson, 29 N.D. 155, 150 N.W. 267 (1914) (publication
of article alleging bias and political subservience to the Supreme Court). This case is probably
not good law today. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1946); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328
U.S. 331 (1945). Cf. State v. Root, 5 N.D. 487, 67 N.W. 590 (1896).
- 18 U.S.C. §401 (1948). The court may also punish by contempt proceedings the mis-
behavior of any of its officers in their official transactions and disobedience or resistance to
its process.
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supra, the court said in citing two cases,3" "The statute does not
require that the 'misbehavior' if committed in the presence of the
court must also be of such character as to 'obstruct the administra-
tion of justice.' That qualification is required only as to misbehavior
not committed 'in the presence of the court'." However, the inter-
pretation of the courts, as indicated by the decisions noted in the
following paragraphs, seem to be exactly contra to the above quo-
tation. The two cases cited as supporting the above quotation make
no mention of such an interpretation of the statute. It also may be
well to note at this time the interpretation of the words "so near
thereto" as used in the above statute. In Nye v. United States 32 it is
said that these words are construed as geographical terms as
distinguished from proximity in casual connection. In that case,
the mere fact that there was an obstruction in the administration
of justice did not bring the condemned conduct within the vicinity
of the court. However, Justice Stone, in dissent says that "near"
may connote proximity in casual relationship as well as proximity
in space, citing several cases where the injurious effect was unre-
lated to distance from the court.3 3 However, if the words "so near
thereto are not read in a geographical sense they come close to
being mere surplusage. Thus it is clear that Nye v. United States,
supra, overrules the theory that by statute, summary punishment
for newspaper publication is authorized, and recognizes the sub-
stantial legislative limitations on the contempt power as indicated
by the words "so near thereto." 31 In Ex parte Craig,"5 the contempt
was held not near enough to obstruct justice, the court saying that,
"Where contempt is committed without the presence of the court
every reasonable doubt will be resolved in favor of the accused."
Therefore, it seems the words "so near thereto" are geographical
terms.'
Ex parte Hudgings 30 demonstrates the necessity of an obstructive
tendency to the administration of justice before the summary con-
tempt power can be exercised. There a witness was adjudged in
contempt of court for testifying falsely. The statement of the
witness which was the basis for the contempt charge was,
a1Ex parte Hudgings, 249 U.S. 378 (1919); Ex parte Craig, 274 Fed. 177 (2d Cir.
1921).
*313 U.S. 33 (1941).
3 Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 749 (1929); Craig v. Hecht, 263 U.S. 255 (1923);
Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402 (1918); Ex prte Savi, 131 U.S.
267 (1889).
" That "so near thereto" is a geographical term see Cuyler v. Atlantic & N.C.R.Co.,
131 Fed. 95 (C.C.E.D. N.C. 1904); Hillmon v. Mutual Life Ins. Co.. 79 Fed. 749
.C.C.D. Kan. 1897); Ex parte Schulenberg, 25 Fed. 211 (C.C.E.D. Mich. 1885).
M274 Fed. 177 (2d Cir. 1921).
-249 U.S. 378 (1919).
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"I cannot say that I can recall that I have ever seen him in
the act of writing. I would not say that I have not, but I would
not say that I have." The witness held by this statement all
through the inquiry, refusing to recognize the writings shown him.
However, the court said that it was thoroughly satisfied, that he
was testifying falsely and held him in contempt, as tending to
obstruct the course of justice in the presence of the court. This
decision was reversed on appeal the court saying, "an obstruction
to the performance of judicial duty resulting from an act done in
the presence of the court is the characteristic upon which the power
to punish for contempt must rest. It is true that there are cases
which treat perjury, without any other element, as adequate to
sustain a punishment for contempt. This, however, overlooks or mis-
conceives the essential characteristic of the obstructive tendency
underlying the contempt power, or mistakenly attributes a neces-
sarily inherent obstructive effect to false swearing." Therefore per-
jury alone is not sufficient, and the rule seems to be that there must
be some circumstance or condition giving it an obstructive effect.
3 7
Mr. Justice Oliver in Rex v. Davies,38 as to defamatory matter said
that whether defamatory matter amounts to contempt in any
particular case is a question of fact, of degree, and of circumstance.
Thus, in ascertaining whether the acts and conduct of relator in
the presence of the court justified the court in holding him in con-
tempt, we must take into consideration all of the facts and cir-
cumstances concerning the case.39
In indirect or constructive contempt proceedings at common
law, if a party. could clear himself upon oath, he would be dis-
charged; but if the statement was perjured, he may be prosecuted
for the perjury.40 Thus at common law by denying intent coupled
with an explanation showing an innocent purpose, one could purge
the contempt. The above rule, however, did not apply if the alleged
acts were clearly contemptuous in character. 41 Also, where -an
officer of the court is himself guilty of violation of some court rule
a disavowal on oath of any intent to violate, together with an ex-
planation will be conclusive.42 Thus, the intent to defy the dignity
and authority of the court was a necessary element of criminal con-
'See also United States v. Appel, 211 Fed. 495 (S.D.N.Y. 1913); In re Michael, 326
U.S. 224 (1945).
w"1 K.B. 435 (1945).
SEx parte Norton, 144 Tex. 445, 191 S.W.2d 713 (1946).
"°See Notes, 6 R.C.L. 523, 534, 535; 9 L.R.A. (NS) 1119.
41United States v. Huff, 206 Fed. 700 (S.D. Ga. 1913). Cf. In re Perkins, 100 Fed.
950 (E.D.N.C. 1900).
"2Darby v. Wesleyan Female College, 72 Ga. 212 (1883); Lightfoot & Flanders v.
Freeman, 54 Ga. 215 (1875).
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tempt. Where contempt in cases of constructive or indirect criminal
contempt consists of acts or statements which are capable of two
constructions, on of which would amount to contempt and the other
not, intent becomes a material question, and if the contemnor denies
under oath that he intended to violate a court order or rule, he is en-
titled to be discharged i An attempt to legislate by statute in regard
to purging of contempt has been done in a few states, e.g. New York
and Indiana,4 4 but generally it seems that purging of contempt has
only been applied to constructive contempt and has gradually been
dropped from our law, except where it has been revived by statute
as aforementioned. However, in Craig v. Hecht,45 this common law
right to purge himself was acknowledged. It seems unfortunate
though that for the majority the purging of contempt has thus been
allowed to drop by the wayside.
Generally speaking, in constructive contempt, notice or hearing
is required, but in direct contempt the court has power to punish
summarily. This is supported by a heavy weight of authority, but
is justice attained by such precedent? A party charged with con-
tempt has the same right to be heard in his defense as a party
charged with any other offense, where life, liberty, or property is
involved.4 6 In People v. Zazove,47 the trial court had declined to
permit defendant to state the facts which constitute his claim of
privilege, or to give him an opportunity to justify his claim. On
appeal it was said that even in direct contempt proceedings and
even though summary he was entitled to a fair hearing and an
opportunity to state the facts constituting his justification.i s Also in
State ex rel. Rankin v. District Ct.,19 the court held that in a direct
contempt proceeding an attorney must be given an opportunity to
answer charges laid against him. (Here the attorney was not given
an opportunity to show no contempt was intended and thus purge
himself.) The result in the preceding case seems to follow the bet-
ter practice as no one should be condemned without a hearing.50
However, as a general rule, it is said that when a contempt is com-
mitted in facie curiae, the court may, in committing the offender,
act of its own knowledge without further proof or examination, and
"in re Rotwein, 291 N.Y. 116, 51 N.E.2d 669 (1943); State ex. rel. Indianapolis Bar
Ass'n v. Fletcher Trust Co., 211 Ind.27, 5 N.E.2d 538 (1937).
" See note 43, supra.
43263 U.S. 255 (1923); See also United States v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563, 574 (1906).
"See State v. Nicoll, 40 Wash. 517, 82 Pac. 895, 896 (1905).
47311 Ill. 198, 142 N.E. 543 (1924).
's Cf. People v. Spain, 307 f]I. 283, 138 N.E. 614 (1923); Sherman v. Peiole, 210 1]1.
.552, 71 N.E. 618 (1904).
"58 Mont. 276, 191 Pac. 772 (1920).
w 4 Encyc. PL & Pr. 789 (1896).
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the accused is not entitled to be heard in his own defense, nor can
he complain that his constitutional rights are infringed by the
refusal of a hearing.5 This, however, seems contrary to the funda-
mental conception of a court of justice which is condemnation only
after hearing. Thus from the above discussion it can be seen that
limitations upon an unqualified contempt power are by legislative
action and by the judiciary itself.
SUMMARY OF CONTEMPT POWER
To PUNISH SUMMARILY
Thus it seems that following the result achieved in Caldwell v.
United States, abandonment of due process requirements (notice,
hearing, and counsel) is confined to a narrow exception which in-
cludes only charges of misconduct in open court, in the presence
of the judge, which disturbs the court's business, where all essential
elements of the misconduct are under the eye of the court, are
actually observed by the court, and where immediate punishment
is essential to prevent demoralization of the court's authority be-
fore the public.
NEGLIGENCE - CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE - THE DocTrINE
OF COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
T HE DOCTRINE of contributory negligence and its harsh results
have been the subject of discussion by many legal writers.' At
common law the slightest negligence of the plaintiff would bar his
recovery from a negligent defendant if the plaintiff's negligence
contributed proximately to the injury.2 This doctrine was early
r Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289 (1888). Cf. re Savin, 131 U.S. 267 (1889); See Note,
57 A.L.R. 545.
1 See Malone, The Formative Era of Contributory Negligence, 41 Ill. L. Rev. 151 (1946);
Malone, Comparative Negligence-Louisiana's Forgotten Heritage, 6 La. L. Rev. 125 (1945);
Mole and Wilson, A Study of Comparative Negligence, 17 Cornell L. Q. 333, 604 (1931);
Comment, 26 N.D. Bar Briefs 30, 41-2 (1950).
-Bartson v. Craig, 121 Ohio St. 371, 169 N.E. 291 (1929) involved the following set
of facts: The plaintiff, a minor, was coasting on a sled on an avenue which had been
blocked off so that it could be used for that purpose, and turned the sled into another
street, where he was struck by an automobile driven by the defendant's agent. The court
instructed the jury that if they found "from the evidence that the plaintiff's own negligence
directly caused or contributed in the slightest degree to cause the injuries complained
of . . ." they should find for the defendant. On appeal this instruction was upheld. The
court said, "The essential element of contributory negligence such as to bar the recovery by
the plaintiff is not the comparative extent or degree of negligence. The test is rather whether
the negligence of the plaintiff, whatever it be, caused or directly contributed to cause the
accident and injury." See also Note, 114 A.L.R. 830 (1938).
